Mercer Law Review
Volume 44
Number 4 Annual Eleventh Circuit Survey

Article 12

7-1993

Securities Regulation
John L. Latham
James A. Shuchart

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr
Part of the Securities Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Latham, John L. and Shuchart, James A. (1993) "Securities Regulation," Mercer Law Review: Vol. 44 : No.
4 , Article 12.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.mercer.edu/jour_mlr/vol44/iss4/12

This Survey Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Mercer Law School Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mercer Law Review by an authorized editor of Mercer Law School
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact repository@law.mercer.edu.

Securities Regulation
by John L. Latham*
and
James A. Shuchart**
This Article surveys significant cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals during 1991 and 1992 in the field of securities regulation. This Article also examines selected Supreme Court decisions during
this survey period that affect Eleventh Circuit precedent.
I.

THE DEFINITION OF A SECURITY

In order to state a claim under the Securities Act of 1933, (the "Securities Act") 1 or the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act"),"
the claim must generally relate to the purchase or sale of a "security."
Although this requirement may seem straightforward, there has been considerable litigation over the years as to what constitutes a "security." Section 2(1) of the Securities Act 3 and Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act4
Partner in the firm of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Atlanta, Georgia. University of Toledo (B.A. cum laude with honors, 1976); Emory University (J.D., 1979). Member,
State Bar of Georgia.
** Associate in the firm of Nelson, Mullins, Riley & Scarborough, Atlanta, Georgia. Mid-*
dlebury College (B.A. cum laude, 1984); Washington University (J.D. Order of the Coif,
1990). Member, State Bars of Georgia and Missouri.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988 & Supp. 1990).
2. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
3. Section 2(1) of the Securities Act provides, unless the context requires otherwise, that:
The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture,
evidence of indebtedness, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement, collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract, voting-trust certificate, certificate of
deposit for a security, fractional undivided interest in oil, gas, or other mineral
rights, any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege on any security, certificate of
deposit, or group or index of securities (including any interest therein or based on
the value thereof), or any put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a
national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or, in general, any interest or instrument commonly known as a "security", or, any certificate of interest or
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define "security" in broad and general terms to achieve the Congressional
goal of protecting investors.0
The only significant Eleventh Circuit decisions during the survey period that addressed the question of what constitutes a security was Rice
v. BranigarOrganization,Inc.7 In Rice the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals considered whether the sale of lots in a housing development and
equity memberships in a country club constituted "securities" for the
participation in, temporary or interim certificate for, receipt for, guarantee of, or
warrant or right to subscribe to or purchase, any of the foregoing.
Id. § 77b(1) (1988).
4. Section 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act provides, unless the context requires otherwise,,
that:
(10) The term "security" means any note, stock, treasury stock, bond, debenture, certificate of interest or participation in any profit-sharing agreement or in
any oil, gas, or other mineral royalty or lease, any collateral-trust certificate, preorganization certificate or subscription, transferable share, investment contract,
voting-trust certificate, certificate of deposit, for a security, any put, call, straddle,
option, or privilege on any security, certificate of deposit, or group or index of
securities (including any interest therein or based on the value thereof), or any
put, call, straddle, option, or privilege entered into on a national securities exchange relating to foreign currency, or in general, any instrument commonly
known as a "security"; or any certificate of interest or participation in, temporary
or interim certificate for, receipt for, or warrant or right to subscribe to or
purchase, any of the foregoing; but shall not include currency or any note, draft,
bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal
thereof the maturity of which is likewise limited.
Id. § 78c(a)(10).
5. See United Hous. Found., Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837 (1975); Holloway v. Peat,
Marwick Mitchell & Co., 900 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 958 (1990).
6. There was at least one significant state court decision during this period as well. In
Cohen v. William Goldberg & Co., Inc., 262 Ga. 606, 423 S.E.2d 231 (1992), the Georgia
Supreme Court rejected the "economic reality" test for determining whether stock ifi a
closely held corporation constitutes a security, adopting, instead, the "stock characterization" test in Landreth Timber Co. v. Landreth, 471 U.S. 681 (1985). Cohen, 262 Ga. at 60708, 423 S.E.2d at 232-33. Under this test, a court looks at the title of the interest (i.e., is it
denominated "stock") and whether the interest possesses some of the significant character-

istics of stock. Id. at 607, 423 S.E.2d at 232. For a discussion of Landreth, see John L.
Latham, Securities Regulation, 38 MERCER L. REV. 1341, 1342-45 (1987).
7. 922 F.2d 788 (11th Cir. 1991). The definition of a security expressly encompasses "investment contracts" under § 2(1) of the Securities Act and § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act.
See supra notes 3 and 4. The Supreme Court has delineated a four part test for determining
whether something is an investment contract, and hence a security. See Securities Exch.
Comm'n v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293, reh'g denied, 329 U.S. 819 (1946). Under Howey
an investment contract or security exists when (i) there is an investment of money (ii) in a
common enterprise (iii) made with an expectation of profit (iv) coming solely from the efforts of a third party. Howey, 328 U.S. at 299.
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purposes of the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act.8 Plaintiffs,
non-equity members of the club, filed a complaint alleging that the sale of
equity memberships in the club and the sale of undeveloped lots each
constituted sales of unregistered securities. Specifically, plaintiffs asserted
that these sales involved "investment contracts" and thus fell within the
definition of a security. After discovery, the district court granted summary judgment for defendant holding that neither the lots nor the equity
memberships were securities.9
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with defendant that. neither the equity
memberships nor the lots constituted a security and affirmed the district
court's ruling. 10 The court pointed out that under Supreme Court precedent a security is not involved when a purchase is made with the primary
intent to use or consume the object purchased. 1 The court concluded
that people buy the types of houses and lots involved in Rice primarily to
use them, not to derive profits from the entrepreneurial efforts of the developers.12 In making this determination, the court noted that the promotional material utilized by the developer to entice purchasers can be
highly relevant, particularly if the material emphasizes the investment
value of the purchase.'
In Rice the promotional material's greatest emphasis was placed on the
beauty of the island and the amenities of the club and the community.",
8. 922 F.2d at 789. See also supra note 5. The real issue is whether an investment
contract was involved. See supra note 7.
Defendant, as part of a residential-unit development, built a large country club with golf
courses and tennis courts. The initiation fees and dues required for membership in the
country club were not included in the purchase price of a house or lot. Later, defendant
created a non-profit corporation and transferred ownership of the club to that corporation.
Only members owning an equity interest were allowed to use the club. The court also addressed whether defendant's representations about land-owners' access to the country club
violated the anti-fraud provisions of the Interstate Land Sales Full Disclosure Act. The
court answered this issue in the negative. 922 F.2d at 789-92.
9. 922 F.2d at 790-91. Plaintiffs also claimed that defendant's failure to disclose that
the non-equity club members would eventually be required to buy equity memberships to
use the club was a misrepresentation violating Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule
10b-5 promulgated thereunder. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 790. See supra note 5. The court stated that it has also looked to the emphasis
provided by promotional material to determine whether the sale of something is a sale of
"securities" for the purpose of federal securities law. 922 F.2d at 790 (citing SEC v. C.M.
Joiner Leasing Corp., 320 U.S. 344 (1943)).
12. 922 F.2d at 790-91. The court pointed out that plaintiffs offered no evidence that a
majority or even a fair number of buyers bought. houses or lots as an investment. Furthermore, the promotional materials did not emphasize the lot's investment values. Only one
passage introduced into evidence referred to buying the property as an investment. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
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The Eleventh Circuit pointed out that the economic reality was that
most, if not all, members bought the equity memberships to use and enjoy the club's facilities. Moreover, the court could find little reason for a
purchaser to invest in the equity of a non-profit company.' 5 Although one
marketing item referred to the investment nature of the property, the
emphasis was on enjoying the beauty of the property and its amenities. In
like fashion, "the promotional material for the equity membership contracts was clearly aimed at selling the memberships to give the purchasers
access to the facilities.'"
Rice appears to have been correctly decided under the facts reported
by the court. While the definition of a security should be broadly construed to effectuate the purposes of the securities laws, it should not be
construed so broadly as to encompass interests in which the investment
aspects are not primary. An overly broad approach to defining a security
hampers commerce without providing meaningful benefit to those involved. The court's willingness to uphold the district court's grant of
summary judgment, in the face of some reference in the promotional material to the investment nature of the property, reflects the court's implicit conclusion that the contrary evidence was not sufficient to create a
"material" question of fact.
II.

OFFEROR OR SELLER

Section 12 of the Securities Act imposes liability for selling or offering
to sell unregistered securities or securities through the use of false communications.1" In Ryder InternationalCorp. v. First American National
Bank,"6 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced the issue of whether
15. Id. at 791. The court pointed out that "both the Securities and Exchange Commission and the Georgia Commissioner of securities ha[d] issued no-action letters in connection
with the sales of the equity memberships." Id. Furthermore, plaintiff offered no evidence
that the purchasers bought the memberships as investments. Id. at 791 n.3.
16. Id. at 791. In fact, potential buyers were sent letters that explicity instructed them

not to buy the memberships as an investment. Id.
17. Section 12 provides that any person who:
(1) offers or sells a security in violation of Section 5 or, (2) offers or sells a security
. . .by the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication
in interstate commerce or of the mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which includes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a

material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading.

. .

and who shall not

sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such ntruth or omission, shall be liable to the
person purchasing such security from him . . ..
15 U.S.C. § 771 (1988).
18. 943 F.2d 1521 (11th Cir. 1991).

1993]
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a bank should be deemed a "seller" under Section 12(2) when it acts as
an intermediary in the purchase of securities for a customer through a
registered dealer."9 Plaintiff, a manufacturing business, regularly made
short-term investments to earn interest on its excess cash. On two occasions plaintiff used defendant bank, First American, to buy commercial
paper issued by Integrated Resources, Inc. ("Integrated"), a New York
Stock Exchange listed company. 0 Integrated was heavily involved in the
business of selling real estate tax shelters." Integrated subsequently defaulted on plaintiff's investment. Plaintiff Ryder later learned that defendant had a lending relationship with Integrated. 2
Prior to 1988, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the definition of "seller" under Section 12 of the Securities Act reached those
persons whose participation in the transaction was a "substantial factor"
in causing the transaction to occur.23 A split of authority existed over who
could be deemed a "seller" and a number of courts required a showing of
privity with the buyer. 4 In Pinter v. Dahl, the United States Supreme
19. Id. at 1524. In Pinter v. Dahl, 486 U.S. 622 (1988), the Court rejected the "substantial factor" test as well as the "privity test" while determining the definition of "seller"
under Section 12(1) of the Securities Act. The decision in Pinterdid not address the issue
under Section 12(2). Pinter,486 U.S. at 642 n.20. The statute does not delineate who should
be regarded as a statutory seller and the courts of appeal have been inconsistent in defining
the term. The sparse legislative history sheds no light on the issue. 943 F.2d at 1524 (citing
Pinter, 486 U.S. at 642).
20. 943 F.2d at 1522-23. On both occasions, plaintiff's agent asked defendant for rates of
90-day paper and was given the rates on several investments, including Integrated paper.
Defendant bought the paper from Drexel Lambert, the underwriter and exclusive dealer for
Integrated. Id.
21. According to the court, Ryder had knowledge of this fact. Id. at 1523. Furthermore,
the court stated that the record did not reveal how much knowledge defendant's loan department had with regard to Integrated's financial difficulties, but, whatever information it
had, was not communicated to plaintiff. Id.
22. Id.
23. See Foster v. Jesup & Lamont Sec. Co., 759 F.2d 838 (11th Cir. 1985). This test was
used for the "definition" of a § 12 seller. "Secondary participants who did not effectuate the
sale could be liable if a plaintiff's injury flowed directly and proximately from their actions."
943 F.2d at 1525 (citing Foster, 759 F.2d at 844 (citing Junker v. Crory, 650 F.2d 1349, 1360
(5th Cir. 1981)).
24. 943 F.2d at 1525. See Collins v. Signetics Corp., 605 F.2d 110, 113 (3d Cir. 1979);
Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 619 F.2d 1222, 1226 (7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
1005 (1981). See generally Bryan M. Schneider, Section 12 of the Securities Act of 1933:
The Privity Requirement in the Contemporary SeCurities Law Perspective, 51 TENN. L.
REv. 235 (1984). Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Pinter,the circuits were split over
whether privity must exist between the plaintiff-purchaser and the defendant-seller in order
for the defendant to be considered a seller under Section 12(2). The Second, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Eighth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits had held no privity was needed. Those circuits
either used a "substantial factor" test, a "proximate cause" test, or a variation of those tests
to define the class of participants who, although not owners of the securities, could never-
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Court rejected the "substantial factor" test utilized by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals as well as the "privity test" for determining who
constituted a seller under Section 12(1) of the Securities Act.25 The Court

held that a person soliciting securities purchases may be held liable as a
seller under Section 12(1) only when the successful solicitation has been
motivated, at least in part, by a desire to serve
the solicitor's own finan2
cial interests or those of the securities owner. 8
In Ryder plaintiff argued that "sound policy and statutory interpretation required that the definition of 'seller' used in Section 12(2) cases be
broader than the Pinter definition for Section 12(1) cases. 217 The Elevtheless be liable under Section 12(2). 943 F.2d at 1524-25. See Pharo v. Smitl, 621 F.2d
656, 664-68 (5th Cir. 1980), holding that "the proper test for section 12 generally lies between the antiquated 'strict privity' concepts and the overbroad 'participation' concept
which would hold all those liable who participated in the event leading up to the transaction, and thus focuses on whether 'the injury to the plaintiff fiow[ed] directly and approximately from the actions of this particular defendant.'" 943 F.2d at 1524 n.9 (citations omitted). See also Davis v. Avco Fin. Serv., 739 F.2d 1057, 1063-68 (6th Cir. 1984) (adopting
proximate cause test under Section 12), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1005, and cert. denied, 472
U.S. 1012 (1985). Lawler v. Gilliam, 569 F.2d 1283, 1287 (4th Cir. '1978) (under Section 12(l), "[l]iability [can] be imposed on any person who actively solicits an order, participates in the negotiati6ns, or arranges the sale, 'but' the definition excludes persons who
executed an unsolicited order or minor role in the transaction shows that they have no casual connection with it"); Anderson v. Aurotek, 774 F.2d 927, 930 (9th Cir. 1985) (liability
under Section 12 depends on whether the acts of the participants are "both necessary to
and a substantial factor in the sales transaction."); Stokes v. Lokken, 644 F.2d 779, 785 (8th
Cir. 1981) (employing substantial factor test). 943 F.2d at 1524 n.9. The Court in Pinter
recognized that "a person may offer or sell property without necessarily being the person
who transfers title to, or other interest, in that property." Pinter,486 U.S. at 642-43. The
Court concluded that participants who, in the transfer of securities, "solicit" a purchase may
also be liable as sellers even though they do not own the securities. Id. at 644-45.
25. See discussion supra note 19,
26. Pinter, 486 U.S. at 644-46. The Court relied, in part, on the statutory inclusion of
"solicitation of an offer to buy" within the definition of sell. Id. at 643. The Supreme Court
rejected both the substantial factor and privity tests used by the circuit courts. Id. at 643654. For a discussion of the various tests, see generally, Patricia A. Ohara, Erosion of the
Privity Requirement in Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: The Expanded Meaning of Seller, 31 U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 921 (1984); Robert N. Rapp, Expanded Liability Under
Section 12 of the Securities Act: When Is a Seller Not a Seller, 27 CAsE W. REs. L. REv. 445
(1977); Leonard Alan Silverstein, Note, Seller Liability Under Section 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933: A Proximate Cause-SubstantialFactor Approach Limited by a Duty of
Inquiry, 36 VAND. L. REv.361 (1983).
27. 943 F.2d at 1526. In particular, plaintiff differentiated the two sections on the basis
that Section 12(1) imposes strict liability, while Section 12(2) allegedly requires only a
showing of negligence. Id. Plaintiff asserted that the broader substantial factor test should
apply to determine the scope of Section 12(2). Under that test, the issue would become
whether First American was a substantial factor in the sale of the commercial paper to
plaintiff, an issue of fact inappropriate for summary judgment. Id. The Court in Pinterhad
expressly declined to take a position on the meaning of "seller" within Section 12(2); how-
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enth Circuit Court of Appeals began its analysis of who should be deemed
a seller under Section 12(2) with the statutory language,18 since the Securities Act uses identical language in Section 12(1) and Section 12(2) to
indicate who may be held liable, the person who may sue, and the remedy
available.2*
Based on the language of Section 12 and the Supreme Court's decision
in Pinter, the Eleventh Circuit modified the "substantial factor" test applicable to Section 12(2) claims to comport with the test enunciated in
Pinter for a Section 12(1) claim. 0 The court reasoned that "applying
Pinterto section 12(2) [wals consistent with the statute's relationship to
the other provisions and underlying policies of the statutory scheme."3 1
After holding that Pinter applied to Section 12(2), the court concluded
that defendant bank could not be held liable on the facts of the case because it was not a seller or solicitor of the securities."2 The record showed
that defendant bank did not own or hold the Integrated commercial paper prior to or at the time plaintiff requested defendant purchase the paper and thus, defendant was not a "seller" of the securities.3 3 Similarly,
defendant bank was not a "solicitor" of the sales at issue.34 Rather, the
court held that an agency relationship existed between defendant bank
ever, it did concede that decisions under Section 12(2) were relevant to the scope of "seller"
under Section 12(1). Pinter, 486 U.S. at 642 n.20.
28. 943 F.2d at 1526 (citing Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 472 (1977);
Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 197; reh'g denied, 425 U.S. 986 (1976)).
29. See 15 U.S.C. § 771(1)-(2) (1988); see also supra notes 17 and 19.
30. 943 F.2d at 1527. The court noted other circuits had similarly modified their tests in
light of Pinter. See Moore v. Kayport Package Express, Inc., 885 F.2d 531, 536 (9th Cir.
1989) (substantial factor test reformulated in light of Pinter, which applies to Section 12
generally); Crawford v. Glenns, Inc., 876 F.2d 507, 510 (5th Cir. 1989) (substantial factor
test reformulated in light of Pinter); Craftmatic Sec. Litig. v. Kraftsow, 890 F.2d 628, 635
(3d Cir. 1989) (test for 12(2) status reformulated to abolish prrvity requirement and conform
with Pinter's test for 12(1) status); Wilson v. Saintine Exploration & Drilling Corp., 872
F.2d 1124, 1126 (2d Cir. 1989) (Pinter,which this court has held applies to Section 12 generally, in part expands and in part contracts the category of persons potentially liable under
Second Circuit case law); Schlifke v. Seafirst Corp., 866 F.2d 935, 940 (7th Cir. 1989) (Pinter
"seems to undermine the continuing viability of [our Circuit's] strict privity requirement
concept under section 12(2)"). 943 F.2d at 1527 n.11.
31. 943 F.2d at 1528. "Section 12(1) creates liability for the sale of unregistered securities, while section 12(2) creates liability for omissions and misrepresentations in a prospectus or oral communication." Id. See discussion supra note 17. The purpose of both sections
is to promote full and fair disclosure of information to potential buyers of securities. This
shared purpose strengthens the reasoning for applying Pinter to both sections. 943 F.2d at
1528.
32. 943 F.2d at 1530.
33. The Integrated notes were "bearer" paper. Furthermore, the notes contained the
same trade dates and settlement dates. This evidence established that defendant never
owned the securities.
34. See discussion supra note 17.
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and plaintiff.8 ' When an agency relationship exists, the agent is in reality
buying on behalf of the purchaser and not selling on behalf of the
owner.Se
The court's approach to Section 12(2) is not surprising and is in keeping with other jurisdictions. The case cannot be read, however, for the
proposition that a bank can never be liable as a "seller" or "solicitor." To
the contrary, a bank that is actively soliciting securities transactions on
behalf of its customers may well be held liable under Section 12.

III.
A.

THE APPLICATION OF RULE

10b-5

Statute of Limitations

Although no private right of action exists in the language of Section
10(b)' 7 of the Exchange Act or Rule 10b-5ss promulgated thereunder, federal courts have implied a private cause of action under that section for
over 45 years.3" The federal courts of appeal have split, however, over
whether to apply federal or state law in determining the appropriate statute of limitations for these private claims under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5.40 As a result, the limitation period for bringing a 10b-5 action va35. 943 F.2d at 1531.
36. Id. (citing Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Cheng, 697 F. Supp. 1224,
1228-29 (D.D.C. 1988)).
37. Section 10(b) provides:
[I]t shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, of any facility of
any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative or deceptive device...
in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j (1988).
38. Rule 10b-5, promulgated pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78j provides:
[Ilt shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility
of any national security exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to
defraud, (b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or (c) To engage in
any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would operate as a fraud
or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1992).
39. See Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
40. See, e.g., Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990); Bath v.
Bushkin, Gaims; Gaines & Jonas, 913 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1990); Short v. Belleville Shoe
Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991); Nesbit v. McNeil, 896 F.2d 380 (9th Cir. 1990); Smith v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir.),
reh'g denied, 904 F.2d 712 (1990); In re Data Access Sys. Sec. Litig., 843 F.2d 1537 (3d Cir.),
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on whether federal law or the law
tied from one to five years, depending
41
of one of the fifty states applied.
On June 20, 1991, in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.Gilbertson,"I the United States Supreme Court created a uniform federal
limitation period for all claims brought under Section 10(b) and Rule
10b-5." The Court held that all claims brought under Section 10(b) and
10b-5 must be initiated within one year after the facts constituting the
and in no event more than
violation are or should have been discovered,
4
three years after the actual violation.4
The case arose out of the sale of seven Connecticut limited partnerships that were formed for the purchasing and leasing of computer
software and hardware. Defendant law firm helped organize the partnerships and provided additional legal services, including preparation of
opinion letters concerning the tax consequences of investment in the limited partnerships. Plaintiffs purchased units in one or more of the partnerships with the expectation of realizing federal income tax benefits
from the investment. After the partnerships failed, the United States Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") subsequently disallowed the claimed tax
benefits because of overvaluation of partnership assets and the lack of a
profit motive."s Plaintiffs purchased the units during 1979 through 1981,
-but asserted that they did not become aware of the alleged misrepresencert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988); Corwin v. Marney, Orton Invs., 843 F.2d 194 (5th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988); O'Hara v. Kovens, 625 F.2d 15 (4th Cir. 1980), cert.
denied, 449 U.S. 1124 (1981).
41. See, e.g., Mosesian v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 727 F.2d 873 (9th Cir.), cert
denied, 469 U.S. 932 (1984) (applying three year limitation based on California law); First
Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n of Miami v. Mortgage Corp. of South, 650 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1981)
(applying two year limitation period based on Alabama law); McNeal v. Paine, Webber,
Jackson & Curtis, Inc., 598 F.2d 888 (5th Cir. 1979) (applying four year fraud limitation
period based on Georgia law); Fox v. Kane-Miller Corp., 542 F.2d 915 (4th Cir. 1976) (applying one year limitation period based on Maryland law).
42. 111 S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
43. Id. at 2773.
44. Id. at 2782. In an extremely controversial one sentence statement, the Court applied
its holding retroactively and dismissed the claims presented in the instant case. Id. Congress
quickly overruled the Court's decision on this point through a provision enacted as part of
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-242,
Title IV, § 476, 105 Stat. 2236 (codified at 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-1) (West Supp. 1992)). Under
this statute, plaintiffs will be able to refile claims within 60 days of enactment, if the claims
were originally commenced on or prior to June 19, 1991, and would have been timely filed
using applicable borrowing principles.
45. Lampf, 111 S.Ct: at 2776. Plaintiffs named as defendants individuals involved in the
preparation of offering memorandum. The complaints alleged that plaintiffs were induced to
invest in the partnerships by misrepresentations, namely, the tax benefits to be realized in
the offering memorandum, in violation of, among other things, Section 10(b) and Rule lob5. Id. at 2776-77.

1290

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

tations, including assurances that the investment would entitle plaintiffs
to substantial tax benefits, until 1985, following the disallowance of the
tax benefits by the IRS.""
The district court granted summary judgment for defendants based on
Ninth Circuit precedent.' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
reversed and remanded. In an unpublished opinion, the Ninth Circuit
held that unresolved factual issues existed as to when plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the alleged fraud, thus precluding sum48
mary judgment.
The Supreme Court's plurality opinion "9 began with the proposition
that when Congress fails to provide a statute of limitations for a federal
cause of action, the court "borrows" or "absorbs" the state limitation period most analogous to the case at bar.50 The Court also noted that, because state legislatures rarely enact limitation periods with federal interests in mind, there is an exception to the rule if the state statute of
limitation frustrates the policies embraced by the federal statute. Based
on Supreme Court precedent, the Court identified a "hierarchy" that determines the appropriate statute of limitations for federal causes of action
as to which Congress failed to delineate a statute of limitations."
Under this hierarchy, the court must first determine whether a uniform
statute of limitations is appropriate. 2 If a uniform limitation period is
appropriate, the court then decides whether it should be derived from a
46. Id. at 2776-77.

47. See Robuck v. Dean Witter & Co., 649 F.2d 641 (9th Cir. 1980). Under Robuck the
Ninth Circuit ruled that Section 10(b) claims were governed by the state statute of limitations for the most analogous forum-state cause of action. The district court determined this
to be Oregon's two-year statute of limitation for fraud claims. OR. REv. STAT. § 12.110(1)
(1989). The district court further ruled that plaintiffs received reports detailing the declining financial status of each partnerships and thus, had notice of the possible fraud as early
as October 1982. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2777.
48. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2777. The Ninth Circuit also selected the two-year Oregon limitation period for fraud claims as the appropriate statute of limitation. Id.
49. The plurality opinion was authored by Blackman, J., joined by Rehnquist, C.J.,
White, and Marshall, JJ., and joined in pertinent part by Scalia, J. Scalia, in a concurring
opinion, joined in the judgment of the Court, but disagreed with the methodology applied.
In the absence of an expressed federal limitation period, Scalia would look to state statutes
of limitations. If the state period is inconsistent with the policies of the federal statutes,
then Scalia would find no limitation period. Id. at 2783.
50. Id. at 2778.
51. Id. at 2778-79.
52. Id. The Court pointed out that in cases in which a federal cause of action tends to
.,encompass numerous and diverse topics and subtopics ... the federal interests in predictability and judicial economy counsel the adoption of one source, or class of sources, for
borrowing purposes." Id. at 2779 (citing Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 273-75 (1985)).
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state or federal statute or source.6 A presumption exists that the court
borrows from a state source unless an analogous federal source truly provides a "closer fit" with the cause of action at issue.54
The Court pointed out that its task in the present case was complicated
by the nontraditional origins of the Section 10(b) cause of action, since
the judiciary, not Congress, created the private cause of action.ss The
Court decided that when a claim is implied under a statute that also contains express causes of action with their own time limitation periods, the
court should look to the expressed limitation periods contained in the
statute for guidance. 6 The Court held that, because the Exchange Act
contains a number of express causes of action with express statute of limitations periods, the Court could appropriately look to those periods to
determine the appropriate limitation period for Section 10b-5 causes of
action. 7 With only one exception,ss every statute of limitations included
within the Exchange Act includes some variation of a one-year period after discovery combined with a three-year period of repose.5' Thus, the

53. Id. at 2779. Under this inquiry, the court should accord particularly weight to the
geographical character of the claim. Id.
54. Id. Commonality of purpose and similarity of elements will be most relevant to this
portion of the inquiry. Id.
55. Id. In fact, the Court pointed out that it was faced "with the awkward task of discerning the limitations period that Congress intended courts to apply to a cause of action it
really never knew existed." Id. at 2780.
56. Id. The Court uses the expressed limitation periods as a clear indication of how Congress might have balanced the policy considerations for a limitation period under Section
10(b). Id. The Court held that if the statute contains comparable express remedial provisions, the time limitation period expressed for those provisions should be used; only when
no analogous counterpart exists should a court proceed to apply state borrowing principles.
Id.
57. Id.
58. Section 16(b) sets a more restrictive two-year period of repose. Id. at 2780 n.5.
59. Section 9(e) of the 1934 act provides: "No action shall be maintained to enforce any
liability created under this section, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the
facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i(e) (1988) (as cited in Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780 n.6).
Section 18(c) of the 1934 Act provides: "No action shall be maintained to enforce any
liability created under this section unless brought within one year after the discovery of the
facts constituting the cause of action and within three years after such cause of action accrued." 15 U.S.C. 78r(c) (1988) (as cited in Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2780 n.6).
Furthermore, Section 13 of the 1933 Act as amended, provides:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 77k or
771(2) of this title unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue
statement or the admission, or after such discovery should have been made by the
exercise of reasonable diligence, or, if the action is to enforce a liability created
under section 771(1) of this title, unless brought within one year after the violation
upon which it is based. In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a
liability created under section 77k or 771(1) of this title more than three years
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Court held that "litigation instituted pursuant to [Section] 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 [must] be commenced within one year after the discovery of
the facts constituting the violation and within three years after such violation." 0 The Court refused to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling" to
the limitation period because the three-year period of repose establishes
an arbitrary and outside limit for bringing these actions, which is incon2
sistent with equitable tolling principles.1
The Court also applied the one year/three year rule retroactively to bar
the claims that were before it.05 Congress quickly responded to the
Court's ruling on the retroactive application of the one year/three year
limitation period by enacting Section 27A of the Exchange Act and effectively "overturning" the Supreme Court's retroactivity ruling.6 The enafter the security was bona fide offered to the public, or under Section 771(2) of
this title more than three years after the sale.
15 U.S.C. § 77m (1988) (as cited in Lampf, 111 S.Ct. at 2780 n.7).
60. Lampf, 111 S. Ct at 2782. Acknowledging the slight difference in terminology
amongst the various statute of limitations periods contained in the Securities and Exchange
Acts, the Court selected the language of section 9(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i(e), as the governing standard for Section 10(b) causes of action. 111 S. Ct. at 2782 n.9.
Furthermore, the Court rejected the Securities and Exchange Commission's argument for
adopting the five year statute of limitations period contained in Section 20A of the 1934
Act, stating that Congress did not intend that provision to extend to other sections of the
Exchange Act: Id. at 2781.
61. This doctrine delays the statute of limitations period until the plaintiff discovers or
should have discovered the'fact comprising the violation.
62. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2782. Four members of the Court dissented from the Court's
judgment in three separate opinions. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, questioned
the action of the federal judiciary, rather than Congress, in rejecting the long-standing principle of state borrowing that had been applied to Section 10(b) actions. Id. at 2783-85. Justice Kennedy joined by Justice O'Connor, agreed with the majority that federal borrowing
was appropriate, and argued for the adoption of the one year from discovery rule, but not
the three-year period of limitation. Id. at 2788. Justice O'Connor, joined by Justice Kennedy, noted her disagreement with the Court's retroactive application of its holding. Id. at
2785-88.
63. Id. at 2782.
64. Section 27A was adopted as part of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 and amended the Exchange Act to provide as follows:
(a) The limitation period for any private civil action implied under section 78j(b)
of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991, shall be the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.
(b) Any private civil action implied under section 78j(b) of this title that was commenced on or before June 19, 1991(1) which was dismissed as time barred subsequent to June 19, 1991, and (2)
which would have been timely filed under the limitation period provided by the
laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such
laws existed on June 19, 1991, shall be reinstated on motion by the plaintiff not
later than 60 days after Dec. 19, 1991.
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actment reinstates the statute of limitations in existence in the applicable
jurisdiction on June 19, 1991 for all Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 cases
filed prior to that date.
Controversy quickly arose over the constitutionality of this enactment.65 The Eleventh. Circuit had an early chance to determine the constitutionality and applicability of Section 27A. In Henderson v.Scientific-Atlanta, Inc.," the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held
Section 27A constitutional and controlling in the case at bar. 7 The district court had borrowed from the Georgia blue sky statute and applied a
two-year statute of limitation that began to run on the date the alleged
fraud was discovered.ss Under this limitation period, plaintiffs' action was
timely. While the parties were awaiting trial, however, the Supreme Court
announced its decision in Lampf, creating the federal one-year/three-year
statute of limitations." Based on Lampf, the district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment.70 While Henderson was on appeal, Congress enacted the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, which amended the 1934 Act by adding
Section 27A.1
The Eleventh Circuit first addressed the effect of Section 27A on the
present case. Section 27A requires the Court to apply "the limitation period provided by the laws applicable in the jurisdiction, including principles of retroactivity, as such laws existed on June 19, 1991.1" As of June
19, 1991, the Eleventh Circuit determined the statute of limitations by
borrowing the most analogous state law."7 The court presumed that Congress was aware of the limitation periods as they existed in all circuits
15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-1 (West Supp. 1992).
65. Compare Bank of Denver v. Southeastern Capital Group, 789 F. Supp. 1092 (D.
Colo. 1992) (declaring section 27A unconstitutional) with Brown v. Hutton Group, 795 F.
Supp. 1307 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (finding section 27A constitutional).
66. 971 F.2d 1567 (11th Cir. 1992), reh'g denied, No. 91-8938 (11th Cir. 1993).
67. 971 F.2d at 1569. Plaintiff class asserted federal claims under Section 10(b) due to
fraudulent admissions, misstatements and misrepresentations that artificially inflated the
price of defendant's stock. Id.
68. Id. See Smith v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1569-70 (11th Cir.), reh'g denied, 904 F.2d 712 (11th Cir. 1990).
69. See supra notes 37-64 and accompanying text. On the same day, the Supreme Court
held in James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991), that when the
Supreme Court applies a new rule to the litigants in a particular case, that rule must be
retroactively applied to all other similarly situated litigants. Id. at 2441.
70. 971 F.2d at 1569.
71. Id. at 1570.
72. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78aa-1 (West Supp. 1992).
73. 971 F.2d at 1571. See Smith v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 891 F.2d 1567, 1569-70 (11th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 904 F.2d 712 (11th Cir. 1990) (rejecting the uniform federal statute of
limitations adopted by other circuits).

1294

MERCER LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

when it passed Section 27A. The court felt compelled to follow the prior
precedent, as codified by Congress. Using the prior
limitation period, the
74
court held that the plaintiffs' action was timely.
The court then addressed the constitutionality of Section 27A in light
of the separation of powers doctrine7 and the Fifth Amendment.7 The
court rejected the separation of powers argument. 7 The court considered
Section 27A as "a classic example of Congress' practice of 'overruling' a
statutory construction by the Supreme Court. '78 The court determined
that Congress had not interfered with the judicial process because the Act
does not require courts to make any particular finding of facts or applications of law to fact.7 '
The court also rejected tlie Fifth Amendment due process argument, as
it found Section 27A to be a rational means of preserving those lawsuits
pending prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf.s0 The court
found the purpose of Section 27A is clear; to reinstate those causes of
action that were timely when filed, but subsequently rendered untimely
by the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf. Merely because the applicable
statute of limitations would thereby vary for a cause of action from one
jurisdiction to another did not render the enactment irrational.81
A uniform limitation period has been badly needed for claims arising
under Rule 10b-5. Prior to Lampf, plaintiffs engaged in forum shopping
74. 971 F.2d at 1571.
75. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
76. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Eleventh Circuit noted that no previous court of appeals
had addressed the constitutionality of section 27A. 971 F.2d at 1571. See Henley v. Slone,
961 F.2d 23 (2d Cir. 1992) (Second Circuit declined to consider the constitutionality of Section 27A until the district court determined on remand whether the plaintiff's action would
be timely under the new statute). The court further pointed out that the district courts are
divided on the issue. 971 F.2d at 1571.
77. 971 F.2d at 1573.
78. Id. at 1571 n.4. See also H.R. REP. No. 102-40(I), 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 14 (1991),
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 552; H.R. REP. No. 102-40(11), 102d Cong. 1st Seas. 1-3
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694-95 (noting primary purpose of the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 was to specifically overrule Supreme Court decisions).
79. 971 F.2d at 1573.
80. Id. at 1574. Defendant's Fifth Amendment challenge was two-pronged:
(1)The Act's retroactive application violates [defendant's] right to due process be-,
cause the Act's purpose is not furthered by rational means, and; (2) The Act deprives [defendant] of equal protection under the law ... because the Act is not
rationally related to the achievement of legitimate government purposes since it
treats citizens of different circuits differently and distinguishes between persons
who filed suit before June 19, 1991, and those who filed suit after that date.
Id. at 1573. The Eleventh Circuit also rejected an equal protection argument finding the
statute rationally related to furthering a legitimate governmental interest. Id. at 1574. See
Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979).
81. 971 F.2d at 1574.
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to insure that Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims were brought in jurisdictions that would not deem the claims time barred. A uniform statute
of limitation discourages forum shopping and helps insure that claims are
brought in a jurisdiction having a meaningful nexus to the dispute. Securities defense counsel should not take too much comfort, however, from
the three year "outside" period in Lampf. Already, plaintiffs in arbitration proceedings have begun to abandon securities claims in favor of state
law fraud claims that typically have a four-year limitation and provide for
equitable tolling. In actions in state and federal courts, claims that might
be untimely under Lampf are being asserted as the predicate acts to a
a four year limitation period and also alRICO8 claim, which contains
8
3
tolling
equitable
for
lows
B. Proof of Scienter
In Magna Investment Corp. v. John Does 1 through 200, 8 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reaffirmed that "severe recklessness" satisfies the scienter requirement under Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5.8 8 The
court in Magna vacated and remanded the "district court's grant of summary judgment for defendant on Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 claims.86
The court vacated the district court's disposition of the Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 claims because the district court granted summary judgment for lack of fraudulent intent, without considering whether defend-

82. A RICO claim is one brought under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations provisions currently codified at 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 1961-1968 (West 1985 & Supp. 1992).
83. See Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143 (1987) (selecting four year statute of limitations period). See also Granite Falls Bank v. Henrickson, 924
F.2d 150 (8th Cir. 1991) and Rodriguez v. Banco Cent., 917 F.2d 664 (1st Cir. 1990) (applying equitable tolling doctrine).
84. 931 F.2d 38 (11th Cir. 1991).
85. Id. at 39. See Woods v. Barnett Bank of Ft. Lauderdale, 765 F.2d 1004, 1010 (11th
Cir.), reh'g denied, 772 F.2d 918 (1985); Kennedy v. Tallant, 710 F.2d 711, 720 (11th Cir.
1983). See supra notes 37 and 38 for the text of these provisions.
86. 931 F.2d at 39. According to the Eleventh Circuit, the district court based its decision on a misreading of Ernst.& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, reh'g denied, 425 U.S.
986 (1976). In Hochfelder, the Supreme Court held that a private cause of action cannot
exist under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b5 without the element of scienter. Hochfelder, 425
U.S. at 193. However, the Supreme Court expressly declined to address the question
"whether, in some circumstances, reckless behavior is sufficient for civil liability under section 10(b) and Rule lob-5." Id. at 193 n.12.
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ant's alleged recklessness 8 ' was sufficient to satisfy the scienter requirement under Eleventh Circuit precedent.88
In like fashion, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant
of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims under Section 18 of the Exchange Act.89 Section 18 imposes liability for material misstatements and
omissions in registration and reporting documents filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The Eleventh Circuit held that there was
no obligation on the part of plaintiff to prove scienter under Section 18
of the Exchange Act; rather, the burden is on defendant to prove he acted
in good faith and had no knowledge that the statement was false or
misleading.' 0
C. Derivative Actions Under the Investment Company Act
In Kamen v. Kemper FinancialServices,"1 the United States Supreme
Court held that there is no uniform federal common law that obligated a
87. The Eleventh Circuit has defined severe recklessness as:
highly unreasonable omissions or misrepresentations that involve not merely simple or even inexcusable negligence, but an extreme departure from the standards
of ordinary care, and that present a danger of misleading buyers or sellers which is
either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the defendant must have been
aware of it.
931 F.2d at 39 n.3 (quoting Woods, 765 F.2d at 1010).
88. Id. at 39.
89. Id. at 39-40. Section 18 provides:
(a) Any person who shall make or cause to be made any statement in any application, report, or document filed pursuant to this chapter or any rule or regulation
thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided
in subsection (d) of section 78o of this title, which statement was at the time and
in the light of the circumstances under which it was made false or misleading with
respect to any material fact, shall be liable to any person (not knowing that such
statement was false or misleading) who, in reliance upon such statement, shall
have purchased or sold a security at a price which was affected by such statement,
for damages caused by such reliance, unless the person sued shall prove that he
acted in good faith and had no knowledge that such statement was false or misleading. A person seeking to enforce such liability may sue at law or in equity in
any court of competent jurisdiction. In any such suit the court may, in its discretion, require an undertaking for the payment of the costs of such suit, and assess
reasonable costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, against either party litigant.
(b) Every person who becomes liable to make payment under this section may
recover contribution as in cases of contract from any person who, if joined in the
original suit, would have been liable to make the same payment.
(c) No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting
the cause of action and within three years after such cause of action accrued.
15 U.S.C. § 78r (1988).
90. 931 F.2d at 39-40.
91. 111 S. Ct. 1711 (1991).
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representative shareholder' in a derivative action, based on the Investment Company Act of 1940, ' to make a demand on the board of directors, when such a demand would be excused as futile under. state law."'
The Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice Marshall, held
that state, not federal, law applies when the application of state law does
not impede the purposes or regulatory objectives of the federal statute.94
The Supreme Court, relying on Burks v. Lasker,9" held that the demand requirement' relates to corporate governance, since it "determine[s] who has the power to control the corporate litigation." 797 The
Court found the demand requirement and futility exception integral to
the balance of power between the individual shareholders and corporate
directors relating to initiation and control of corporate litigation; a balance struck best under state law." The Court also observed that the futility exception controlled the scope of the directors' power to terminate
derivative litigation once it had been initiated, by establishing the degree
of deference to which the directors decision would be entitled." Requir92. The Investment Company Act is designed to regulate investment companies that
provide mutual fund services to shareholders. 15 U.S.C. § 80(a)-I to (b)-21 (1988).
93. 111 S. Ct. at 1723.
94. Id. at 1717. The case concerned an action brought by a shareholder of a mutual fund
registered under the Investment Company Act. The complaint alleged that the fund's investment advisor and manager violated the proxy solicitation provisions of the 1934 Act by
causing the fund's directors to distribute a misleading proxy statement soliciting shareholder's approval to continue the investment management agreement between the advisor
and fund. The complaint sought damages to be paid to the fund. The shareholder did not,
prior to filing the complaint, make a demand on the fund's board of director to bring the
suit, alleging such a demand would have been futile. Id. at 1714-15.
95. 441 U.S. 471, 489 (1979) (holding federal court should look to state law in determining whether disinterested directors of registered investment company possess power to terminate a non-frivolous derivative action founded upon the Investment Company Act of 1940
and the Investment Advisors Act of 1940).
96. The Court first rejected any suggestion that the demand requirement was either created or controlled by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.1, which provides in pertinent part,
that:
[tihe complaint [in a shareholder derivative action) shall ... allege with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the plaintiff
desires from the directors or comparable authority and, if necessary, from the
shareholders or members, and the reasons for the plaintiff's failure to obtain the
action or for not making the effort.
FED. R. Ctv. P. 23.1 (as cited in 111 S. Ct. at 1716). Although this rule clearly contemplated
both the demand requirement and the possibility that the demand may be excused, the
Court held it was a rule of procedure, which did not itself create a demand requirement of
any dimension. 111 S.Ct. at 1716.
97. 111 S. Ct. at 1719.
98. Id. at 1719-20.
99. Id. If demand at first had been made by the shareholders, then under the law of
many states the directors' decision to terminate litigation would be considered under the
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ing shareholder demand even under circumstances in which it would be
deemed futile under state law "would enlarge the power of directors to
control corporate litigation."1 00 The Court stated that it would have displaced state law in this area if the futility exception to the demand requirement were inconsistent with the policies underlying the Investment
Company Act;'in this case, however, the Court found no such
inconsistency. 101
D. Class Actions-Settlement Bar Orders
One of the most significant decisions affecting securities litigation during the survey period involved the enforceability of settlement bar orders
in class actions. Bar orders typically terminate or "bar" the assertion of
cross-claims and third party claims for contribution or indemnification
between non-settling parties and settling parties. Absent bar orders,
many securities defendants are unwilling to settle, since the remaining
cross-claim or third party claim prevents termination of their involvement in the litigation. In In re U.S. Oil & Gas Litigation,0 2 the Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the imposition of a settlement bar order and established the standard of review in similar cases to be an abuse
of discretion.'0 2 In that case, the Federal Trade Commission filed an enforcement action against the various oil and gas companies after they sold
their services to 8,000 customers. The district court then appointed a receiver to protect the customers' interests. After filing a complaint on his
own behalf, the receiver instituted a class action on behalf of the customers alleging securities fraud and RICO violations. 10' A settlement was
reached that dismissed the claims against certain defendants by the rebusiness judgment rule, which affords extremely wide latitude to directors and makes it
difficult for a shareholder to challenge their decision successfully. Id.
100. Id. Moreover, the Court concluded that abolition of the futility exception to the
demand requirement would place federal courts in the role of determining the deference to
be given to the director's decision to forego or terminate litigation. This would create an
entire body of federal court law in contravention of the federal court's general deference to
state law on general corporate matters. Id. at 1720-21.
101. Id. at 1722. The Court noted that the Investment Company Act imposes controls
and restrictions on the internal management of investment companies and it is not designed
to give corporate directors greater power to preclude shareholders' derivative litigation than
they possess under the law of the state of incorporation. d.
102. 967 F.2d 489 (11th Cir. 1992).
103. Id,at 491. In this case, the gas and oil companies sold an advisory service to investors seeking to bid on federal oil and gas leases. The customers were obtained through telephone solicitations. The investments were extremely risky because no return on the invest-

ment was had unless the customers were successful in the lease auctions. Id.
104. Id. This case illustrates how cumbersome and complex this type of litigation can
become. The complaint named 95 defendants and in a six-year period the court held 50
hearings, plaintiffs attended 260 depositions, and discovery produced hundreds of thousands
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ceiver and plaintiff class, and barred "all claims" by non-settling defendants against settling defendants, as well as any claims that the settling
defendants might have had against non-settling defendants, related to the
subject matter of the litigation.105 The district court later entered a second settlement bar order that extinguished all claims related to the litigation against other settling defendants. 106
The first issue presented to the Eleventh Circuit was whether the district court erred in entering the settlement bar order itself. 07 The court
began its analysis by recognizing the strong public policy favoring pretrial settlement of class action lawsuits.108 The complaining defendant argued that independent claims and indemnity claims cannot be precluded
of relevant documents. ' As the trial date approached, plaintiffs stipulated that over 700 issues of fact were still unresolved. Id.
105. Id. at 492.
106. Id. at 493. One defendant objected to this second settlement bar order based on its
cross-claim against one of the settling defendants. The district court concluded that:
if litigation of cross-claims were allowed, the resources of the court, class members, class members' counsel, and defendants' counsel would continue to be expended, because it would be impossible to try cross-claims without addressing the
complex facts underlying this litigation .... Settlements in complex cases cannot
satisfy their ultimate purposes unless they conclude the litigation in its entirety.
Id.
107. Id. The order provided, in relevant part:
All claims, however denominated, regardless of the allegations, fact, law, theories,
or principles on which they are based, including but not limited to claims for contribution or indemnity against the settling defendants by any individual corporation, partnership, unincorporated association, or other type of entity, including
but not limited to any party to this litigation, which claims now exist or have
accrued or in the future may exist or accrue, and which arise out of or are in any
way related to the class action or the receiver's action or the subject matter of
those actions, or arise out of or are in any way related to the Companies, are
extinguished, discharged, satisfied, and/or otherwise unenforceable.
Id. at 493 n.2.
108. 967 F.2d at 493 (citing Cotton v. Hinton, 559 F.2d 1326, 1331 (5th Cir. 1977)). Class
action settlements require court approval and such approval is within the sound discretion
of the district court.- Bennett v. Behring Corp., 737 F.2d 982, 987 (1lth Cir. 1984). The court
noted that class action settlements increasingly incorporate'settlement bar orders. "Defendants buy little peace through settlement unless they are assured they will be protected
against co-defendants' efforts to shift their losses through cross-claims for indemnity, contribution, and other causes relating to the underlying litigation." 967 F.2d at 494. See FED. R.
Civ. P. 23(e).
This case presented a slightly unusual situation where a settling defendant challenged a
settlement bar order. In most cases, non-settling defendants challenge the bar order as prejudicial to their rights. Another distinctive feature of the case related to the severability of
the settlement bar order. Generally, when the parties stipulate that the bar order is integral
to the settlement, a reviewing court may not consider the order in isolation. Instead, it usually can review only the entire settlement. In the present case, however, the specific defendant preserved its right to challenge and appeal the bar order and the settlement itself ex-
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through settlement bar orders, but rather, that such orders are only properly entered in cases when a non-settling defendant seeks to preserve contribution claims against settling defendants. The court found this argument without merit.109
The court noted that several federal courts have approved of settlement bar orders against indemnity claims." 0 The court also found the
settlement bar effective against the allegedly independent causes of action for fraud and negligence. The court found that these claims were not,
in fact, independent and were "nothing more than claims for contribution
or indemnification with a slight change in wording.""' Thus, the court
held that "the propriety of the settlement bar order turn[s] upon the inter-relatedness of the claims that it precludes, not upon the labels which
parties attach to those claims.""' The decision removes much of the uncertainty that has historically plagued settling defendants in complex litigation regarding the applicability and enforceability of bar orders. The
decision in U.S. Oil & Gas will facilitate and encourage many parties to
reach an early settlement.
E. Criminal Violation of the Securities Laws
In United States v. Langford,"5 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
faced an issue of first impression. At issue was whether the use of multiple mailings or instrumentalities of interstate commerce in furtherance of
pressly contains language showing that the particular defendant did not waive its right to
appeal. 967 F.2d at 494-95.
109. 967 F.2d at 495-96.
110. Id. at 495 (citing In re Jiffy Lube Sec. Litig., 927 F.2d 155 (4th Cir. 1991); Franklin
v. Kaypro Corp., 884 F.2d 1222 (9th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 232 (1992); United
States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Patriot's Point Dev. Auth., 788 F. Supp. 880 (D.S.C. 1992)).
Additionally, the substantive weakness of the indemnity claim itself supported entry of the
settlement bar. The weakness resulted because indemnity claims are not cognizable under
federal securities laws. Id.
Ill. 967 F.2d at 496 (quoting South Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Stone, 749 F. Supp. 1419,
1433 (D.S.C. 1990)).
112. Id. For example, in a cross-claim one defendant sought damages to the extent it was
liable to any plaintiff. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that the present case did not encompass the situation in which a cross-claim unrelated to defendants' liability to plaintiffs
remained in the case. In fact, the court questioned if truly independent claims, which a
settlement bar order cannot extinguish, can ever remain in a class action lawsuit. Id. at 496
n.5. The court further held that the district court did not deny the complaining defendant
due process. Id. at 496. The court pointed out that a settlement bar order can be issued
against a non-settling defendant by the district court after it makes a reasoned determination that to do so is fair and equitable. Id. In this case the district court properly entered a
settlement bar order when defendant participated fully in settlement negotiations and utilized every opportunity to preserve its rights within those negotiations. Id.
113. 946 F.2d 798 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1562, (1992).
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a conspiracy to defraud a purchaser of securities can form the basis of
multiple counts of an indictment under the provisions of Sections 10(b)11' and 32' 15 of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. The court
held that it could not."
The appellant, president and chief executive officer of a federal stock
association, devised and carried out a fraudulent scheme that artificially
inflated the price of the association's stock. The federal grand jury indicted appellant on ten counts related to this scheme.117
114. Section 10(b) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means
or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any
national securities exchange-(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any
stop-loss order in connection with the purchase or sale, of any security registered
on a national securities exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as
the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest
or for the protection of investors. (b) To use or employ, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities exchange or any
security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as
necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988).
115. Section 32(a) provides certain criminal penalties for a violation of the Exchange
Act (other than violation under section 30A) and states that:
(a) Any person who willfully violates any provision of this chapter (other than
section 78dd-1 of this title), or any rule or regulation thereunder the violation of
which is made unlawful or the observance of which is required under the terms of
this chapter, or any person who willfully and knowingly makes, or causes to be
made, any statement in any application, report, or document required to be filed
under this chapter or any rule or regulation thereunder or any undertaking contained in a registration statement as provided in subsection (d) of section 780 of
this title, or by any self-regulatory organization in connection with an application
for membership or participation therein or to become associated with a member
thereof, which statement was false or misleading with respect to any material fact,
shall upon conviction be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more
than 10 years, or both, except that when such person is a person other than a
natural person, a fine not exceeding $2,500,000 may be imposed; but no person
shall be subject to imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or
regulation if he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation.
15 U.S.C. § 78ff (1988).
116. 946 F.2d at 799.
117. Id. at 799-800. Count one charged defendant with conspiring to commit an offense
against the United States in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1988). Counts two, three and four
charged the defendant with securities fraud, relating to false statements made in a proxy
statement, a telephone call and a letter, in violation of 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and 78ff (1988).
Counts five and six alleged false entry offenses in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1006 (1988).
Count seven charged a false statement offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1988). And
counts eight, nine and ten alleged the misapplication of the funds of an insured institution
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 657 (1988). 946 F.2d at 800-01. The court granted acquittal on
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The court concluded that the allowable unit of prosecution under Rule
10b-5 is the use of a manipulative device or contrivance", and held that
the indictment was multiplicitous. 11' Because the sentences- were concurrent, however, and all the evidence would still be available and would
lead to a conviction on any single count, the court held that the multiplicity of counts was harmless error. The court treated the convictions and
sentences on counts two, three and four of the indictment as merged into
one count.2
IV. PROXY SOLICITATION
Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act authorizes the Securities and Exchange Commission to adopt rules for the solicitation of proxies, and prohibits violations of the promulgated rules.121 Pursuant to Section 14(a),
the Securities and Exchange Commission promulgated Rule 14a-9, which
prohibits the solicitation of proxies by means of materially false or mis2
leading statements or omission.

2

counts eight, nine and ten. The jury found appellant guilty on counts one through seven. Id.
at 801.
In a footnote, the Court dismissed all issues on appeal except whether the securities fraud
counts were multiplicitous. Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in multiple
counts. Id. at 802 (citing United States v. Anderson, 872 F.2d 1508 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
493 U.S. 1004 (1989)). To determine whether an indictment is multiplicitous, the court must
first determine the allowable unit of prosecution; in the present case, the court must examine the allowable unit of prosecution within the securities provisions. Id.
118. 946 F.2d at 803. In United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 829 (1975), the old Fifth Circuit held that a defendant could be charged with the
same scheme incorporated into each count of an indictment. Furthermore, the court found
it clear that the use of the mails in conjunction with separate purchases or sale transactions
can provide for multiple counts. 946 F.2d at 804 (citing Sanders v. United States, 415 F.2d
621, 626 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 976 (1970)).
119. 946 F.2d at 804. The indictment did not allege that each mailing contained specific
material misstatements; it did not allege that use of the mails was in conjunction with separate purchases or sales transactions. Id.
120. Id. at 805.
121. Section 14(a) provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, by the use of the mails or by any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce or of any facility of a national securities
exchange or otherwise, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the
protection of investors, to solicit or permit the use of his name to solicit any proxy
or consent or authorization in respect of any security (other than an exempted
security) registered pursuant to Section 781 of this title.
15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (1988).
122. Rule 14a-9 provides, in relevant part:
No solicitation subject to this regulation shall made by means of any proxy statement. . . containing any statement, which, at the time and in the light of circum-
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In Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg,123 the United States Supreme Court addressed two questions arising from a "freeze-out"
merger:12 ' (1) whether a statement in a proxy solicitation that is couched
in conclusory or qualitative terms purporting to explain the directors' reasons for recommending certain corporate action can be materially misleading and (2) whether a minority shareholder, whose vote is not required by law or corporate by-law to authorize the corporate action
subject to the proxy solicitation, also can establish damages attributable
to the misleading or inaccurate solicitation. The court held that knowingly false statements of reasons for director or board approval may be
actionable, even though conclusory in form, but that a Section 14(a) private right of action does not extend to minority shareholders whose votes
are not required by law or corporate by-law
to authorize the corporate
12 5
action subject to the proxy solicitation.
In Virginia Bankshares, shareholders of First American Bank of Virginia ("FABV") brought an action against the holding company, the
wholly owned subsidiary, and the lirectors of FABV after their proxies
were solicited in connection with a freeze-out merger into the bank's parent company, Virginia Bankshares, Inc. ("VBI"). Prior to the challenged
action, VBI owned 85% of FABV, with the remanding stock held by approximately 2,000 minority shareholders. In the solicitation, the directors
urged approval of the merger plan and stated that the board approved
the plan because of its opportunity for the minority shareholder to
achieve a "high" value for their shares."' Plaintiff claimed that the minority shareholders were defrauded by the proxy, which contained material misrepresentations.1 27 The complaint was couched in two counts,
stances under which it is made, is false or misleading with respect to any material
fact, or which omits to state any material fact necessary in order to make the
statements therein not false or misleading ....
17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1992).
123. 111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
124. The "freeze-out" merger involved a merger of a target bank into a wholly owned
subsidiary of the holding company. The subsidiary owned eighty-five (85%) percent of the
stock of the target company; the remaining fifteen (15%) percent was held by minority
shareholders who were to lose their interest (i.e., be frozen out) as a result of the merger.
The minority shareholders would be compensated for their loss at a price determined to be
fair. Id. at 2755.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 2756. The Fourth Circuit found that such statements were materially misleading for purposes of Rule 14a-9 under the Exchange Act and that plaintiffs could pursue
their claims even though their votes were not legally required to approve the merger. See
Sandberg v.Virginia Bankshares, 891 F.2d 1112 (4th Cir. 1989). Although most minority
shareholders gave the proxies requested, plaintiff Sandberg did not. After the merger she
sought damages from VBI, FABV and the Directors of the Bank. 111 S. Ct. at 2756.
127. 111 S. Ct. at 2756.
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Count one for the solicitation of proxies in violation of Section 14(a) and
Rule 14a-9 5 and Count two for breach of the fiduciary duty owed to the
minority shareholders under state law. The jury found for plaintiff on
both counts and awarded plaintiff eighteen dollars a share.1 2 ' On appeal,
the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the verdict in part, finding
the statements to be both misleading and actionable by the minority
shareholders.130
On certiorari, the Supreme Court first addressed the actionability of
statements of reasons, opinion, or belief, applying the materiality standard previously announced by the Court in TSC Industries, Inc. v.
Northway, Inc. 1 The Court concluded that it was substantially likely
that a reasonable shareholder, in deciding how to vote on a recommended
corporate action, would consider the directors' belief about the recommended action and their specific reasons for urging the stockholders to
embrace the recommendations to be very important.8 2 The Court held
that statements of reasons, opinions, or beliefs are statements "with respect to material facts" and can form the basis of Section 14 liability because such statements are factual in two senses: (1) as statements that
directors do act for the reasons stated or hold the belief expressed, and
(2) as statements about the subject matter of the reason or belief
expressed. 8 '
128. See supra notes 121-22. The complaint alleged, among other things, that "the directors had not believed that the price offered was high or that the terms of the merger was
fair, but had recommended the merger only because they had no alternative if they wished
to remain on the Board of Directors." 111 S. Ct. at 2756.
129. This amount represented the difference between the price per share plaintiff would
have received under the plan and the amount plaintiff would have received if her stock had
been valued adequately. 111 S. Ct. at 2756.
130. Id. See Sandberg v. Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 891 F.2d 1112 (4th Cir. 1989), rev'd,
111 S. Ct. 2749 (1991).
131. 426 U.S. 438, 449 (1976) (the Court held a fact to be material "if there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding how to
vote").
132. 111 S. Ct. at 2757. The Court pointed out that "shareholders know that directors
usually have knowledge or experience far exceeding the normal investor's resources, and the
directors' perceived superiority is magnified even further by the common knowledge that
state law customarily obliges them to exercise their judgment in a shareholder's interest."
Id.
133. !d. at *2758. The Court qualified its holdings in two respects. First, the Court
warned that a defendant's alleged belief or disbelief in a statement "standing alone" would
not support a Section 14(a) claim absent objective evidence that the statement expressly or
implicitly asserted something false or misleading about a subject matter, Id. at 2760. Second, the Court stated that conclusory statements of reasons may in some instances be
counter balanced by complete disclosure of the offending statement's factual basis. Id. The
Court held that unless the presence of accurate information elsewhere in the proxy state-
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After holding that the statements were actionable in the abstract, the
Court held that the minority shareholders had not demonstrated that the
proxy solicitations were an essential link to the adoption of the freeze out
merger.' 8 ' A solicitation is an essential link only when applicable state
law or corporate by-laws require the proxy solicitation to effectuate the
merger. 35 The Court, examining the legislative history, found no evidence
of congressional intent to expand the implied right of action under Section 14(a) to protect shareholders whose votes were not legally required.' ss The Court explicitly stated that its holding does not dispose of
the issue of whether Section 14(a) provides a cause of action for shareholders' loss of state. remedies such as relinquishing appraisal rights by
voting for a merger, or failing to seek to prevent it, based on a false proxy
statement. The Court was unpersuaded by the argument that, in the interest of public relations, VBI and FABV would not have gone8 through
the merger without the approval of the minority shareholders.' '
V.

SHORT-SWING INSIDER LIABILITY

In Gollust v. Mendell,' the United States Supreme Court unanimously held that a plaintiff who instituted a suit to recover short-swing
profits against statutory insiders under Section 16(b)' 8 ' may continue to
ment "discredit[s] the [misleading statement] so obviously that the risk of real deception
drops to nil," liability will exist. Id.
134. Id. at 2760.
135. Id. at 2762 (discussing Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co:, -396 U.S. 375 (1970)).
136. Id. at 2763-64. Two dissenting opinions argued that causation had been demonstrated. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Marshall, expressed the expansive view that

"shareholders may bring an action for damages under section 14(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 . . . whenever materially false or misleading statements are made in
proxy statements." Id. at 2768. Justice Kennedy, in a lengthy dissent, joined by Justices
Stevens, Marshall, and Blackmun, argued that the nonvoting theories of causation urged by
the SEC's brief were cognizable, and that the evidence in this case demonstrated that, had
the truth been disclosed, informal measures could have been brought to bear that would
have caused abandonment of the merger or changes in its terms. Id. at 2768-73.
137. Id. at 2765-66.
138. 111 S. Ct. 2173 (1991).
139. Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act, provides:
For the purpose of preventing the unfair use of information which may have been
obtained by such beneficial owner, director, or officer by reason of his relationship
to the issuer, any profit realized by him from any purchase and sale, or any sale
and purchase, of any equity security of such issuer (other than an exempted security) within any period of less than six months unless such security was acquired in
good faith in connection with a debt previously contracted, shall inure to and be
recoverable by the issuer, irrespective of any intention on the part of such beneficial owner, director or officer in entering into such transaction of holding the security purchased or of not repurchasing the security sold for a period exceeding
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prosecute the action after his stock in the issuer is exchanged, through a
merger, for stock in the issuer's new corporate parent. 40
The Court, in a unanimous opinion written by Justice Souter, based its
decision on the plain meaning of the statutory language and the Court's
interpretation of congressional intent.'" The Court noted that, unlike
most of the federal securities statutes that confer enforcement authority
on the Securities and Exchange Commission, Section 16(b) depends on
the issuer's security holders to bring suit. 4" The statute's only standing
restriction is that the plaintiff must be the owner of a security of the
issuer at the time the suit is instituted. 4 3 The Court concluded that Congress intended "instituted" to mean the commencement of the action."4
The Court next addressed the issue of whether plaintiff, in the present
case, maintained a financial stake in the outcome. The Court held that
the statute requires only a modest financial stake to support a plaintiff's
standing." 5 In the present case, the equity interest in the issuer's parent
4
was sufficient."
six months. Suit to recover such profit may be instituted at law or in equity and in
any court of competent jurisdiction by the issuer, or by the owner of any security
of the issuer in the name and in behalf of the issuer if the issuer shall fail or refuse
to bring such suit within-sixty days after request or shall fail diligently to prosecute the same thereafter; but no such suit shall be brought more than two years
after the date such profit was realized.
15 U.S.C. §§ 78p(b) (1988).
140. 111 S. Ct. at 2176. Plaintiff owned stock in Viacom International, Inc. ("International") and brought suit against a certain statutory insider on behalf of the corporation,
alleging that the insider was liable to International for approximately $11 million in shortswing profits. Less than six months after plaintiff filed his complaint, Arsonal Holdings, Inc.
("Arsonal") acquired International in a reverse triangular merger. As part of the merger,
Arsonal changed its name to Viacom, Inc. and became the sole stockholder of International,
exchanging all of International's stock for a combination of cash and stock in Viacom. Id.
141. Id. at 2178-81.
142. Id. at 2178.
143. Id. at 2179.
144. Id. The Court rejected the defendant's claim that a plaintiff must maintain ownership of the issuer's security throughout involvement in the lawsuit. The Court found this
position unsupported by either the text of the statute or its legislative history. The Court
did, however, hold that section 16(b) requires a plaintiff's security holder to maintain some
"financial stake" in the outcome of the litigation. Id. at 2179-80.
145. Id. at 2181. Section 16(b) places no significant restrictions on the type or amount of
security necessary to confer standing. It does not even require that the plaintiff own the
security of the issuer at the time of the short-swing trading.
146. Id.
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ARBITRATION

Types of Claims for Which Arbitration May Be Compelled

A significant number of appellate decisions during the survey period
concerned securities arbitration, and the types of claims for which arbitration may be compelled continues to expand. 147 In Gilmer v.Interstate!
Johnson Lane Corp.," the United States Supreme Court held that9
claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act ("ADEA")"
are subject, under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"),6 0 to compulsory
arbitration pursuant to an agreement and securities registration
application. 15'
The Court rejected plaintiff's argument that arbitration was inconsistent with the statutory framework and purposes of the ADEA.'" The
Court stated the congressional intent in enacting the ADEA was "to promote employment of older persons based on their ability rather than age;
to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; [and] to help employers and workers to find ways of meeting problems arising from the
impact of age on employment."'"" The Court found no inherent inconsistency between the policies advanced by ADEA and enforcing agreements
to arbitrate age discrimination claims.' 5 ' The Court pointed out that

claims under the Sherman Act, 155 the Securities Exchange Act,"' and
RICO" 7 are appropriate for arbitration even if they also advance important public policies." 86
147. However, the National Association of Securities Dealers (the "NASD"), a primary
self-regulatory organization for broker/dealers, recently approved new rules barring class actions in arbitration. See NASD Notice to Members 91-65 (1992).
148. 111 S. Ct. 1647 (1991).
149. Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 Pub. L. No. 909-202, 67 Stat. 658
(1967) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988)).
150. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 to 14 (1970 & Supp. 1992).
151. 111 S. Ct. at 1650. Plaintiff was a former registered representative who served as
the manager of financial services for the brokerage firm. The arbitration agreement was not
contained in an employment contract with the firm, but instead, was contained in his registration applications with the various securities exchanges. Therefore, the Court found it
unnecessary to discuss the issue of whether the FAA excluded employment contracts from
the scope of the Act. Section 1 of the FAA provides that "nothing herein contained shall
apply to contracts of employment of seaman, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce." 9 U.S.C.A. § 1 (West 1970).
152. 111 S. Ct. at 1652.
153. Id. (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 621(b) (1988)).,
154. Id. at 1653.
155. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1985 & Supp. 1992).
156. 15 U.S.C. §3 78a-78kk (1988 & Supp. 1990).
157. 18 U.S.C. § 1961 (1991 & Supp. 1992).
158. 111 S. Ct. at 1653.
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The Court was unpersuaded that arbitration would undermine the role
of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") in enforcing the ADEA, because an individual worker would remain free to file a
charge with the EEOC, notwithstanding the arbitration proceeding. "
Furthermore, the EEOC could still file charges of its own against the firm,
notwithstanding the existence of the arbitration agreement.160 The Court
could not discern any congressional intent to preclude resolution of
ADEA claims in any forum other than the federal courts 63
In a subsequent decision in Bender v. A.G. Edwards,& Sons, Inc.,'

the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that an employee's Title VII
claims, based upon sexual harassment, were subject to compulsory arbitration under the FAA."" The court, citing the 1991 Fifth Circuit decision
in Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.'1" and cases from the Sixth and
Ninth Circuits, 1" concluded, without much discussion, that Title VII
claims were subject to compulsory arbitration,'66 The Eleventh Circuit
found the reasoning in Gilmer dispositive of the agreement to arbitrate
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 1653-54. In fact, the congressional grant of current jurisdiction over ADEA
claims to state courts further shows the lack of congressional intent to resolve all ADEA
claims in federal court.
Gilmer also raised a host of challenges to adequacy of arbitration procedures in general.
The Court noted that it recently rejected most of these arguments because they "'rest[] on
suspicion of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the substantive law to would-be complainants', and as such, they are 'far out of step with our current
strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of resolving disputes.' Id.
at 1654 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 481
(1989)).
The Court distinguished earlier cases on the grounds that they arose in the collective
bargaining context and did not involve motions to compel arbitration under the FAA. Id. at
1656. See, e.g., McDonald v. City of West Branch, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (declining to compel
arbitration of civil rights claims); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., Inc., 450 U.S.
728 (1981) (declining to compel arbitration of claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act);
Alexander v. Gardener-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974) (declining to compel arbitration for
Title VII claims). The holding in Alexander seems jeopardized by the reasoning of Gilmer,
which appears to apply with equal force to claims arising under Title VII and other civil
right statutes. In fact, the Supreme Court vacated an order by the Fifth Circuit refusing to
compel arbitration of Title VII claims and remanded it for consideration in light of Gilmer.
Upon remand, the Fifth Circuit reversed its earlier position and held that Title VII claims
were arbitrable. Alford v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
162. 971 F.2d 698 (11th Cir. 1992).
163. Id. at 700. The employee, a stockbroker, agreed to arbitrate disputes with her employer in her applications to register with the NASD and NYSEX. Id.
164. 939 F.2d 229 (5th Cir. 1991).
165. See Mago v. Shearson-Lehman Hutton, Inc., 956 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1992); Willis v.
Dean-Witter Reynolds, Inc., 948 F.2d 305 (6th Cir. 1991).
166. 971 F.2d at 968.
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Title VII claims, even though Gilmer involved claims under the ADEA.
The court saw no reason to distinguish between ADEA claims and Title
VII claims.",
Although there is technically a split of authority on the arbitrability of
Title VII claims,1s the jurisdictions that have held these claims non-arbitrable have not addressed the issue since the Supreme Court's decision in
Gilmer. The jurisdictions that have examined the issue post-Gilmer have
held Title VII claims to be arbitrable.'69
B. Standard of Review for Arbitration Awards
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals refused to adopt the "manifest
disregard of the law" as the standard used to vacate an arbitration award
in Ainsworth v. Skurnick.1 70 The Eleventh Circuit pointed out "that
courts are generally prohibited from vacating an arbitration award on the
basis of errors of law". M The grounds enumerated in the Federal Arbitration Act' 7 ("FAA") have been held as the exclusive grounds for vacating

or modifying an award. 17 The court pointed out that although many
167. 939 F.2d at 230 (both ADEA and Title VII are similar civil rights statutes and both
are enforced by the EEOC).
168. See Utley v. Goldman Sachs & Co., 883 F.2d 184 (1st Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 1045 (1990) and Swenson v. Management Recruiters Int'l, Inc., 858 F.2d 1304 (8th Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 872 F.2d 264 (1989) (both holding Title VII claims cannot be forced into
arbitration).
169. See Mago, 956 F.2d at 932 and Willis, 948 F.2d at 305 (subjecting Title VII claims
to compulsory arbitration).
170. 960 F.2d 939 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3455 (1993). In this case, a
customer sued the securities broker for negligence in handling his securities account. The
arbitration panel found negligence on the part of the broker but failed to award mandatory
monetary damages provided for under Florida law. 960 F.2d at 939. See FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 517.211 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993). The district court vacated the arbitration judgment as
being in manifest disregard of the law. 960 F.2d at 940. Although an incorrect statement of
the law, the decision was upheld on the grounds that the ultimate decision of the arbitration
panel denying damages was arbitrary or capricious. Id.
The Eleventh Circuit previously discussed this issue and failed to adopt the manifest disregard of the law. See Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
201 (1992).
171. 960 F.2d at 940.
172. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-14 (1987).
173. See O.R. Securities v. Professional Planning Assoc., 857 F.2d 742, 746 (11th Cir.
1988). The FAA provides:
In any of the following cases the United States Court in and for the district
wherein the award was made may make an order vacating the award upon the
application of any party to the arbitration
(1) Where the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue means, (2)
Where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators, or either of
them, (3) Where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to postpone
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courts and the Eleventh Circuit have discussed the use of a "manifest
disregard of the law standard, ' 1 74 the Eleventh Circuit has never adopted
that standard as a ground for vacating an arbitration award.17 5 Nonetheless, although great deference is normally accorded to an arbitration
award, courts generally refuse to enforce an award that is arbitrary or
capricious. 7 An award is arbitrary and capricious only if "a ground for
the arbitrator's decision cannot be inferred from the facts of the case."""
The court found that in this case there was absolutely no explanation
in the award itself explaining why damages were not awarded."17 Because
the arbitration panel knew or should have known that Florida law required the imposition of monetary damages, the panel's refusal to award
damages was clearly arbitrary.7 9
It is difficult to understand how the approach taken by the Eleventh
Circuit to arbitration awards that are contrary to law is meaningfully different than the manifest disregard for the law standard utilized in several
other jurisdictions. Future decisions will be needed to ascertain how the
Eleventh Circuit will apply the arbitrary and capricious standard and
how it differs, if at all, from the manifest disregard standard favored by
other courts. Until the rule is refined in this circuit, the court's willingthe hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evidence pertinent
and material to the controversy; or of any other misbehavior by which the rights
of any party have been prejudiced, (4) Where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon
the subject matter submitted was not made. (5) Where an award is vacated and
the time within which the agreement required the award to be made has not expired the court may, in its discretion, direct a rehearing by the arbitrators.
9 U.S.C.A. § 10(a) (1987). Unless one of these situations exist, the statute directs the court,
if requested by one of the parties, to enter an order confirming the award. See 9 U.S.C. § 9
(1988).
174. See Robbins v. Day, 954 F.2d 679 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 201
(1992); Todd Shipyards Corp. v. Cunard Line, Ltd., 943 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1991); Marshall
v. Green Giant Co., 942 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1991); Upshur Coals Corp. v. United Mine Workers of America, 933 F.2d 225 (4th Cir. 1991); Advest, Inc. v. McCarthy, 914 F.2d 6 (1st Cir.
1990); Jenkins v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 847 F.2d 631 (10th Cir. 1988); Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Bobker, Inc., 808 F.2d 930 (2d Cir. 1986).
175. See Robbins, 954 F.2d at 684; Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., 903 F.2d 1410, 1412 (11th Cir. 1990). However, the court pointed out that its own cases
were unclear as to whether the Eleventh Circuit had ever held it would be error to vacate an
arbitration award as being in manifest disregard of the law. See 960 F.2d at 941.
176. 960 F.2d at 941.
177. Id. (quoting Raiford, 903 F.2d at 1413).
178. Id. The panel had concluded that the claimants sustained no damages and therefore were not entitled to recover any monetary reward. This conflicted with the mandatory
damage provision under Florida law. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 517.21 (West 1988 & Supp.
1993).
179.. 960 F.2d at 941.
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ness to vacate awards that are contrary to law will increase the likelihood
that customers and brokerage firms will appeal from unfavorable
decisions.
In Robbins v. Day, 80 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals confirmed
the arbitration and rejected the Trustee/claimants' contention that the
arbitrators' refusal to compel the respondent brokers to testify, after asserting their Fifth Amendment privileges against self-incrimination, was a
refusal to hear evidence so as to warrant vacation of an award due to
misconduct. 8' The court acknowledged that judicial review of arbitration
awards is expressly limited and great deference is to be given to the arbitrator's resolution of the dispute.8's Furthermore, the basis for review of a
award is specifically delineated in the Federal Arcommercial arbitration 183
bitration Act ("FAA").
The court examined the arbitrators' actions under the FAA. 184 The
court held "[tlhat the award should not be vacated under 19 U.S.C.] section 10(a)(3) because prior to the arbitration hearings both Paine Webber
and the brokers moved to postpone the hearings until after the pending
criminal proceedings, which then would have made it possible for the brokers to testify."' 85 The Trustee/claimants opposed the continuance on the
grounds that the brokers' testimony was "unimportant" to the Trustee's
case. The court held that it was within the arbitrators' broad discretion to
accept the Trustee's representations that the brokers' testimony was unimportant and, if given, would only provide cumulative evidence.'"6 Furthermore, the arbitrators enjoy wide latitude in conducting the hearing
and are not constrained by formal rules of procedure or evidence. 8 " Thus,
the court held that the arbitrators stayed well within their broad discretion in facilitating a fair hearing and in fashioning the award. 88
180. 954 F.2d.679 (11th Cir. 1992), cert, denied, 113 S. Ct. 201 (1992).
181. 954 F.2d at 679.
182. Id. at 682.
183. Id. at 682-83.'
184. Id. The brokers in question pled the Fifth Amendment's provision against self-incrimination during the hearings and refused to testify because they were under indictment
for securities fraud arising from the same set of facts that gave rise to the securities litigation. Id. at 684.
185. Id. at 684.
186. Id. at 685.
187. See Hoteles Condado Beach, La Concha & Convention Ctr. v. Union De Tronquistas Local 901, 763 F.2d 34, 38 (1st Cir. 1985). The court also pointed out that the basic
policy of conducting arbitration is to offer a means of deciding disputes expeditiously and at
lower cost and, thus, a summary hearing, even that restricts inquiry into factual issues, is
permissible. 954 F.2d at 682 (citing Booth v. Hume Publishing, Inc., 902 F.2d 925, 931 (11th
Cir. 1990)).
188. 954 F.2d at 685. The arbitration lasted 12 days and the NASD panel awarded the
plaintiffs $325,000 and dismissed the claims against two of the brokers. The Trustee origi-
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Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit in Schmidt v. Finberg's affirmed an arbitration award in favor of the customer and against the broker.190 In this
case, the parties had extreme difficulty in agreeing to arbitration dates. 19'
Once the hearing was finally conducted, the arbitration panel awarded
substantial damages to the customer."9 ' The broker filed a motion in district court to vacate the award, challenging the arbitration panel's refusal
to postpone the hearing or to extend it in order to receive a party's
testimony. 193
The court held that a trial court's denial of a motion to vacate an arbitration award under the FAA is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
standard.19" Thus, defendants had the burden to convince the court that
it was an abuse of discretion by the district court in not finding "misconduct" by the panel when it denied defendants' request for a postponement of the hearing. "9
The Eleventh Circuit concluded that the issue was whether there was
any reasonable basis for the arbitrators to refuse to postpone the hearing
or to continue it in order to receive defendant's testimony. 1s6 The court
nally sought $4,200,000 in actual damages, $12,000,000 in punitive damages, $12,600,000 in
RICO damages, attorney fees, costs, and expenses totaling over $26,800,000 in damages. Id.
at 681.
189. 942 F.2d 1571 (11th Cir. 1991).
190. Id. at 1576. Plaintiff filed suit against Paine Webber and two brokers to recover
losses sustained in his Commodities Account. Defendants caused the case to be removed to
federal court and then had the federal actions stayed pending arbitration. Id.
191. The dispute was originally set for final arbitration on February 9, 1989. Approximately one month prior to this date, the parties mutually agreed to an adjournment. The
hearing was rescheduled for June 1, 1989. The panel then granted a requested adjournment
after both sides stipulated to adjournment because both attorneys were scheduled to participate in another arbitration proceeding previously set for the same day. The panel rescheduled the hearing for January 16, 1990 through January 18, 1990. Plaintiff requested a con tinuance on December 16, 1989 citing discovery disputes between the parties as appropriate
grounds. The parties met on January 16. 1990 for a pre-hearing conference. The panel asked
the parties to inform it when they would be available for a final hearing in May. Defendants
wrote to the panel and stated they would not be available during the second and third
weeks of May, 1990. The panel set the hearing for the second week in May. The panel
refused to change the date of the hearing and it proceeded to a conclusion. Id. at 1572-73.
192. Id. at 1573. One of the grounds cited by defendants for being unavailable the second week of May was a principal witness and a party to the litigation would be absent and
unable to testify. Id.
193. Id.
194. Id. (citing Raiford v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 903 F.2d 1410,
1412 (11th Cir. 1990)).
195. Id.
196. Id. at 1574.
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reasons to support the panel's action and affound good and sufficient
97
firmed the award.
In Szuts v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.,1' s the Eleventh Circuit Court
of Appeals vacated an arbitration award made by two arbitrators following disqualification and removal of a third arbitrator.'" The court began
with the proposition that "the power and authority of the arbitrators in
an arbitration proceeding is dependent on the provisions of the arbitration agreement under which the arbitrators were appointed" 00 In the
present case, the arbitration agreement incorporated by reference the Securities Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association
("AAA").2'0 The arbitration agreement provided that "[a]ny arbitration
hereunder shall be before at least three arbitrators.''0 Thus, two arbitra-

tors alone deciding an award violated the arbitration agreement. 03
The court held that Rule 20 of the AAA Securities Arbitration Agreement did not change the analysis.' 0 ' Rule 20 provides, in pertinent part,
that "[in event of a vacancy in a panel of neutral arbitrators after the
hearings have commenced, the remaining arbitrator or arbitrators may
continue with the hearing and determination of the controversy, unless
the parties agree otherwise."' 05 The court held that because the actual
197. Id. at 1574-75. The court actually had to surmise the possible explanations for
Panel's action because the arbitrators gave no reason for denying the postponement. The
court pointed out that arbitrators have neyer been required to explain their awards because
the proceedings are summary in nature. See, e.g., O.R. Securities, Inc. v. Professional Planning Assoc., Inc., 857 F.2d 742, 747 (11th Cir. 1988).
The court pointed out the following potential reasons: First, the panel may have been
confused as to what was meant by defendants' statement that they would be available the
"first week in May." 942 F.2d at 1574. The panel set the hearing for May 8 through 10,
which was the first full week in May. Thus, the panel may have thought it was in conformity with defendants' timing request. Second, in its request for postponement, defendants did
not express or give any indication as to what testimony the missing defendant would give
that would be material to the issues raised in the claim. The panel could have reasonably
believed that whatever testimony needed to be given on behalf of defendants would be given
by the missing defendants' partner. Third, defendants had ample opportunity to have preserved his testimony through deposition. Finally,. the panel may have decided that the proceeding had already been protracted so long as to violate the policy of expeditiously handling such disputes. Id.
198. 931 F.2d 830 (11th Cir. 1991).
199. Id. at 832.
200. Id. at 831. See Coast Trading Co. v. Pacific Molasses Co., 681 F.2d 1195, 1198 (9th
Cir. 1982) (authority of arbitration panel comes from purchase agreement contract for
arbitration).
201. American Arbitration Assoc., SECURrrIEs ARBITRATION RULES §§ 1-57 (1989).
202. 931 F.2d at 831.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
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arbitration agreement required three arbitrators, the parties "agreed otherwise," thus prohibiting the application of the going-forward provision of
Rule 20.208. The court held that the arbitrators violated the provision of
the arbitration agreement requiring three arbitrators and thus, exceeded
their authority.2 7
In Blue Gray Corp.'s I & H v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc.,20 the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals faced the issues of
(1) whether an "exception clause 20 9 in the arbitration agreement permits
plaintiffs the option of choosing whether to submit controversies involving claims arising under federal securities laws to arbitration, and
(2) whether the state law claims fall within the language "controversies
involving claims arising under federal securities laws" and thus could be
resolved through litigation rather than arbitration.2 10
The Eleventh Circuit agreed with the district court that the plain
meaning of the arbitration agreement provided an exception to arbitration for claims arising under federal securities laws. 21 ' As to state law
claims, the Eleventh Circuit held that the contract claim provided for
them to be arbitrated, even those that arise out of
the same transaction
21 2
or occurrence as the federal securities law claims.
The decision in Blue Gray is unlikely to have a significant impact on
future arbitration disputes, since the parties were dealing with contract
language that had been adopted by the brokerage firms pursuant to SEC
Rule 15c2-2(a)2 18 after the decision in Shearson/American Express, Inc.
206. Id. at 832.
207. Id.
208. 921 F.2d 267 (11th Cir. 1991).
209. Id. at 267. The clause stated, "[elxcept to the extent that controversies involving
claims arising under the Federal securities laws may be litigated, it is agreed that any controversy between us arising out of your business' or this agreement shall be submitted to
arbitration ...." Id. at 269.
210. Id. at 269.
211. Id. at 270. The court refused to find the language ambiguous. See Nemes v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 741 F. Supp. 657 (E.D. Mich. 1990); Axtell v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1989). Arbitration clauses
are creations of contract; parties are required to arbitrate only those claims they have
agreed to arbitrate. Goldberg v.Bear, Stearns & Co., 912 F.2d 1418, 1419 (11th Cir. 1990)
(courts should not twist the language to achieve a result that is favored by federal policy but
contrary to the interest of the parties).
212. 921 F.2d at 271.
213. Rule 15c2-2(a) stated that:
It shall be a fraudulent, manipulative or deceptive act or practice for a broker or
dealer to enter into an agreement with any public customer which purports to
bind the customer to the arbitration of future disputes between them arising
under the Federal securities laws, or to have in effect such an agreement, pursuant
to which it effects transactions with or for a customer.
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v. McMahon2 " but prior to the decision by the United States Supreme
Court in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson-AmericanExpress.215 The provision at issue in Blue Gray is not utilized in arbitration agreements prepared by brokerage firms post-Rodriguez.
C. Should Arbitration be Compelled
In Chastain v. Robinson-Humphrey Co.,21s defendant brokerage firm
removed the case to federal court and then moved to compel arbitration
of one of the customers' securities claims against the company.217 The
issue raised was whether the district court or the panel of arbitrators
should determine whether the customer agreement that contained the arbitration clause was enforceable when the customer alleged that her signature to the agreement had been forged."" Under the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 19 a district court must compel arbitration if the
parties have agreed to arbitrate their dispute.22 0 However, the Eleventh
Circuit held that if the existence of an agreement to arbitrate itself is at
issue, the district court, not a panel of arbitrators, must decide if the arbitration clause is enforceable against the parties.2
VII.

CONCLUSION

The most significant decision during the survey period was the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf, which established a uniform limitation
period for claims arising under Rule 10b-5. Although there was some
17 C.F.R. § 240.15c2-2(a) (1987). Rule 15c2-2 was rescinded effective October 21, 1987. See
52 Fed. Reg. 39, 216 (1987).
214. 482 U.S. 220 (1987). McMahon held that claims arising under the Exchange Act
were arbitrable.
215. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). Rodriguez overturned Wilko v. Swann, 364 U.S. 427 (1953),
and held that claims arising under the Securities Act were arbitrable. 490 U.S. at 485.
216. 957 F.2d 851 (11th Cir. 1992)
217. Id. at 853. The complaint alleged that the company illegally opened and maintained
a security trading account in her name, engaged in illegal churning and fraudulently in-

duced her to pay her other indebtedness under the account. The company first removed the
case to federal court then sought to compel arbitration, citing the broad arbitration clauses
contained in the customer agreement. The customer claimed never to have agreed to either
the customer agreements or the arbitration clauses, The district court denied the motion to
comply arbitration. The district court expressed doubt about the existence of a valid and
enforceable contract, especially in light of plaintiff's affidavit stating that she did not sign
the agreement and did not authorize anyone to affix her signature. In fact, the defendant
admitted the signature on the original customer agreement was not that of the plaintiff.
218. Id. at 853-54.
219. 9 U.S.C. §§ 1-306 (1988 & Supp. I1 1991).
220. See id. §§ 2,3 (1988).
221. Id. § 4. See also Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
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speculation that Congress might extend the limitation period, that now
appears unlikely given the limited approach to the limitation period
taken by Congress in amending the Exchange Act as part of the FDIC
Improvements Act.
The Supreme Court's decisions in McMahon and Rodriguez, which
made all claims under the Securities Act and the Exchange Act subject to
arbitration, appears to have reduced the number of substantive decisions
in the securities area, as much of the prior case law was developed in the
context of broker/dealer litigation. The primary focus of the appellate decisions involving arbitration awards has been on procedural issues. It is
expected that this trend will continue.

